Competition, Strategy, and Institutions - Modultafeln der TU Ilmenau

You can find all information about the course here:

https://moodle2.tu-ilmenau.de/course/view.php?id=388

Exam: alternative form of examination: 2 essays, max 50 points each

details of the certificate: Essays are written in form of open book examination, i.e. all available materials may be used

• Anmeldebeginn: 05.11.2021
• Anmeldeschluss: 12.11.2021
• Rücktrittsfrist: 12.11.2021
• letzte Änderung der Fristen: 15.10.2021

Microeconomics

Strategic business behavior on competitive markets lies at the heart of any market economic system. This course aims at a deep understanding of competitive interaction in realistic market environments (oligopolies; presence of competition rules and regulatory institutional frameworks) as a precondition for analyzing the pros and cons of different business strategies from a social perspective. This framework is subsequently used to analyse and understand strategic business behaviour in complex (interactive) market environments, both in terms of applied theory and in terms of actual case studies. The purpose of this subject is to render the students capable of mastering the modern economics of competition, strategy, and institutions. It explicitly focuses on: (i) imparting knowledge about (a) the modern, state-of-the-art economics of competition, (b) the modern, state-of-the-art economics of strategy, (c) the modern, state-of-the-art economics of institutions, and (d) the interface between these three areas, (ii) enhancing skills in assessing theoretical and empirical problems in competition, strategy, and institutions on a high academic level, and (iii) qualifying students to master the scientific analysis of competition, strategy and institutions by applying advanced theories, concepts, tools and methods as well as to understand strategic business behavior in complex (interactive) market environments.

1. Introduction
2. The Economic Theory of Competition, Strategy, and Institutions
3. Unilateral Strategies with Strategic Interdependency
3.1 Predatory Pricing Strategies
3.2 Advertising and Brands
3.3 Bundling & Tying, Exclusive Dealing and Boycotts
3.4 Raising Rivals' Costs
3.5 European Competition Policy Framework
4. Mergers and Acquisitions
4.1 General Notes
4.2 Analyzing Mergers - European Competition Policy
5. Cartels, Cooperation, Alliances and Networks
5.1 Types and Effects of Enterprise Cooperation
5.2 The Problem of Stability
5.3 Detection of cartels
5.4 European Competition Policy Framework
6. The Global Dimension
6.1 Market Concentration Worldwide
6.2 International Antitrust Institutions

PowerPoint-presentations with animation; Work in groups; Case studies; Project work; Exercises. Lecture slides and accompanying material of the exercises are available in Moodle course.

• Bishop, Simon & Walker, Mike, The Economics of EC Competition Law, aktuelle Auflage, London: Sweet & Maxwell.

• Motta, Massimo, Competition Policy: Theory and Practice, aktuelle Auflage, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

• Kerber, Wolfgang & Schwalbe, Ulrich, Economic Principles of Competition Law, in: F. J. Säcker et al. (eds), Competition Law: European Community Practice and Procedure, London: Sweet & Maxwell 2008, pp. 202-393.

• Schwalbe, Ulrich & Zimmer, Daniel, Law and Economics in European Merger Control, aktuelle Auflage, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

• Kerber, Wolfgang, Wettbewerbspolitik, Vahlens Kompendium, Bd. 2, aktuelle Auflage, München: Vahlen. •Bagwell, K., The Economic Analysis of Advertising, in: Handbook of Industrial Organization, Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier 2007, 1703-1844. •Budzinski, O., Impact Evaluation of Merger Control Decisions, in: European Competition Journal 9 (1), 2013, 199-224.

•Budzinski, O., International Antitrust Institutions, in: R.D. Blair & D.D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 1, Oxford: OUP 2015, 119-146.

•Choi, J.P. & Gerlach, H., Cartels and Collusion: Economic Theory and Experimental Economics, in: R.D. Blair & D.D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 2, Oxford: OUP 2015, 415-441; Levenstein, M.C. & Suslow, V.Y., Cartels and Collusion: Empirical Evidence, in: R.D. Blair & D.D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 2, Oxford: OUP 2015, 442-463.

•Elzinga, K.G. & Mills, D.E., Predatory Pricing, in: R.D. Blair & D.D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 2, Oxford: OUP 2015, 40-61.

•Jayaratne, J. & Ordover, J., Coordinated Effects, in: R.D. Blair & D.D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 1, Oxford: OUP 2015, 509-528.

•Keating, B. & Willig, R.D., Unilateral Effects, in: R.D. Blair & D.D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 1, Oxford: OUP 2015, 466-508.

•Salinger, M.A., Vertical Mergers, in: R.D. Blair & D.D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 1, Oxford: OUP 2015, 551-586.

•Salop, S.C. & Scheffman, D.T., Raising Rivals' Costs, in: The American Economic Review 73 (2), 1983, 267-271; Scheffman, D.T. & Higgins, R.S., Twenty Years of Raising Rivals' Costs: History, Assessment, and Future, in: George Mason Law Review 12 (2), 2013, 371-387.

•Tirole, J., The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer, in: Competition Policy International 1 (1), 2005, 1-25.

•White, L.J., Monopoly and Dominant Firms: Antitrust Economics and Policy Approaches, in: R.D. Blair & D.D. Sokol (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Vol. 1, Oxford: OUP 2015, 313-344.