Victoriia Noskova and Oliver Budzinski (Economic Theory Group, TU Ilmenau) presented their research "Prospects and Limits of Merger Simulations as a Computational Antitrust Tool" at the Stanford University conference Computational Antitrust: Implementing Antitrust 3.0. The virtual conference brought together leading antitrust and competition policy scholars to discuss the implications of path-breaking recent research on competition policy. The underlying Stanford Computational Antitrust Project aims to explore how legal informatics could foster the automation of antitrust procedures and the improvement of antitrust analysis. Victoriia Noskova and Oliver Budzinski examine the promises and downsides of merger simulations as a tool of computational antitrust. Considering perspectives from industrial economics, institutional economics, and political economics, they show that, why and how institutions matter to reap considerable prospects of merger simulations as a computational antitrust tool.