In a new article Oliver Budzinski and Victoriia Noskova from the Chair for Economic Theory (Institute of Economics) investigate the institutional side of computational antitrust.
Since computational antitrust is gaining high attention from competition authorities worldwide, this paper examines the promises and downsides of merger simulations as a tool of computational antitrust. In doing this, the authors first provide an overview of the working mechanisms of the merger simulation tool and then evaluate its implementation in competition policy, including the question of whether more sophisticated technologies would change analysis. The authors consider perspectives from industrial economics, institutional economics, and political economics. The results of the analysis show that institutions matter to reap considerable prospects of merger simulations as a computational antitrust tool.
The paper is published in the Stanford Computational Antitrust Journal, which is part of the CodeX project of Stanford University.
Link: https://doi.org/10.51868/13 .